Interdisciplinary Social Studies
P-ISSN: 2808-0467
E-ISSN: 2808-5051

Assessment of reintegration of ex-Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorists under operation safe corridor in North East Nigeria

Ishaku Hamidu*, University of Kashere, Nigeria
Nyahama Daniel Bulila, National Orientation Agency (NOA), Nigeria

*Email for Correspondence: ishakuhamidu1041@fukashere.edu.ng buliladaniel@gmail.com

Keywords:
deradicalization
North East
Operation Safe Corridor
reintegration

ABSTRACT

The study aims to evaluate the reintegration program for former Boko Haram and ISWAP combatants in North East Nigeria. A cross-sectional study was conducted with 500 respondents. Data were collected using a structured questionnaire. The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics. The results indicated that 105 respondents, representing 52.5% agreed that economic, social, and political factors were vital to the success or challenges of the program. They also strongly agreed that less cases of recidivism were a factor affecting the success of the programme. The research contributes to understanding the design of inclusive programs that consider both community and individual needs, aiming to enhance social cohesion and minimize conflict in post-conflict environments. Furthermore, the research on effective communication strategies to inform and engage host communities could shed light on methods to foster understanding and reduce fear regarding ex-combatants. The establishment of independent oversight bodies could be studied to understand their role in monitoring program financing, stakeholder accountability, and resource management.

This is an open access article under the CC BY-SA license.

INTRODUCTION

It is an established fact that Nigeria's armed conflicts with Boko Haram and Islamic States in West African Province (ISWAP) have claimed several lives, displaced people and battered sociopolitical and economic activities in the North East and beyond without immediate solution. In line with the above, Hamidu (2023) observed that military approach and all efforts to end the armed conflict between state and non-state actors have not provided the desired results. Hence, the State, through the military authorities keyed into non-combatant military approach, by initiating the reintegration programme for repentant or surrendered terrorists from either Boko Haram or Islamic States in West African Province (ISWAP). The introduction of this approach under Operation Safe Corridor led to the establishment of de-radicalization and skills training camps in Gombe State and other places where those ex- Boko Haram or Islamic States in West African Province (ISWAP) combatants were psychologically, religiously and economically reoriented before being released to political authorities and thereafter, reintegrated into the larger society. This approach has assisted tremendously in encouraging some of the war-lords to surrender their weapons and underwent reintegration process.

Nevertheless, significant numbers of the repentant and re-integrated former war-lords are facing stigma and there is phobia on and by them and the community. This is affecting their decision, personality and social relations negatively. The programme is also facing some institutional and community related challenges, which might cause or led to several undesirable negative consequences. It is the submission of the study that if those issues are not properly handled and managed, might jeopardize the initial gains of reintegration process. The study therefore exposed some of the challenges and mentioned some recommendations, as it little contributions for the sustenance of the programme and to ensure the security of individual's personality, lives and property of the people in North East Nigeria and beyond.

Nigerians and other public affairs scholars express worries over huge numbers of causality, displacement of persons, due to Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorism in North East geopolitical zone, despite military approach to the menace. In spite the introduction of Operation Safe Corridor, the terrorists' activities are ongoing in the North East. There are indications that some ex-terrorists are threatening to go back to the bush, and others are said to have return to the bush already. Government's strategy for total deradicalization, rehabilitation, and

reintegration of repentant Boko Haram/ISWAP members seems not to be understood by the ex-terrorists' and members of the host communities.

In international conflicts, combatants typically belong to recognized legal armed forces, possessing an organized command structure and a disciplinary system (Bartels, 2023; Jöbstl, 2020; Kienou, 2021; McQuinn et al., 2021; Worsnop, 2023). However, intrastate wars complicate this definition, as many guerrilla and paramilitary groups lack clear organizational structures. To address this, some members of the international community suggest a broader definition of combatants to include anyone directly involved in hostilities, intending to cause harm to an adversary (Banholzer, 2014). This inclusive approach helps identify individuals for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs, especially in contexts like North East Nigeria, where ex-combatants, including former Boko Haram members, undergo de-radicalization efforts (Lafreniere & Callaghan, 2004).

The DDR framework, a cornerstone of post-conflict environments, is widely supported by organizations like the UNDPKO, UNDP, and NGOs. Since gaining prominence in the 1990s, DDR has generally followed the one-man-one-weapon model, where ex-combatants surrender weapons in exchange for incentives, training, and reintegration support (Caramés, 2006). Despite its prevalence, this approach often focuses on short-term security measures rather than long-term reintegration and development. Critics argue that DDR should extend beyond immediate conflict resolution to address broader socio-economic needs, fostering positive and sustainable peace. Integrating DDR with long-term developmental goals could better ensure stability and reduce the potential for future violence (Galama & Tongeren, 2002; Özerdem, 2009).

Reintegration remains a complex DDR component, involving both short-term and long-term processes. While initial reinsertion aids ex-combatants' return to civilian life, long-term reintegration seeks to embed them fully into society, addressing social, economic, and political needs (Body, 2005; Kingma, 2000). Successful reintegration also requires community-focused initiatives, empowering communities to support ex-combatants and avoid dependence on criminal activities. Participation is essential in DDR, with a focus on inclusive decision-making and community involvement. Through initiatives like Nigeria's Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC), a collaborative approach involving multiple agencies, the Nigerian government supports ex-combatants' transition, demonstrating how comprehensive reintegration and active community involvement can enhance DDR's overall impact (Holmes, 2001).

The study aims to evaluate the reintegration program for former Boko Haram and ISWAP combatants in North East Nigeria. It focuses on identifying reintegration strategies, understanding community perceptions and levels of acceptance, and examining factors influencing the success or challenges of these efforts. Additionally, it assesses the wellbeing of reintegrated individuals within host communities. Key research questions address the specific reintegration approaches used, community understanding and participation, factors affecting program success, and the quality of life for former combatants post-reintegration.

The research contributes to understanding how reintegration programs can be optimized to foster community acceptance and long-term stability. By examining local perceptions and the wellbeing of reintegrated individuals, it offers valuable insights into designing inclusive programs that consider both community and individual needs, aiming to enhance social cohesion and minimize conflict in post-conflict environments.

METHOD

The study adopted mixed design. Such method of inquiry combined both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Besides, Focus Group Discussion was also used to collect information from some of the people interviewed. The population of the study was derived from communities of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States. The sample size for this study was 500 respondents. 200 selected from the ex-Boko Haram/ISWAP combatants and 300 from the affected/host communities.

After getting permission from security operatives and political leaders of the host communities, the researchers and other research assistants administered the questionnaires to the respondents. Out of the total of 215 questionnaires distributed, a total of 200 questionnaires were retrieved. Also on the side of the communities, 350 questionnaires were distributed and 300 were retrieved. These represent 100% of respondents at both ends.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

After collating the data, results were presented in tabular form and analyzed using simple percentage. Key: SA = Strongly Agree. A= Agree. U= Undecided. D= Disagree. SD = Strongly Disagree

Table 1. Approaches for Reintegration of Ex-Terrorist Combatant into Communities

S/N	Items for Ex-B.H & ISWAP terrorists	Rating Scale					
		SA	***A***	***U***	***D***	***SD***	***Total***
1	You were informed about reintegration programme	95 47.5%	100 50%	0 0%	5 2.5%	0 0%	200 100%
2	You were Deradicalized	98 49%	95 47.5%	0 0%	5 2.5%	2 1%	200 100%
3	You were Rehabilitated	98 49%	95 47.5%	0 0%	5 2.5%	2 1%	200 100%
4	Socially Reintegrated	100 50%	80 40%	0 0%	10 5%	10 5%	200 100%
5	Economically Reintegrated	98 49%	95 47.5%	0 0%	7 3.5%	0 0%	200 100%

S/N	Items for Community Members	***SA***	***A***	***U***	***D***	***SD***	***Total***
1	You were informed about reintegration programme	20 6.7%	30 10%	0 0%	135 45%	115 38.3%	300 100%
2	Reconciliation with ex-combatant	10 3.3%	20 6.7%	0 0%	170 56.7%	100 33.3%	300 100%
3	Community Compensation	15 5%	10 3.3%	0 0%	177 59%	98 32.7%	300 100%
4	Involved in the process	30 10%	20 6.7%	0 0%	160 53.3%	90 30%	300 100%
5	Reconciliation	80 26.7%	50 16.7%	0 0%	75 25%	95 31%	300 100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

The data obtained shows that 100 respondents, representing 50% agreed that they were fully informed about the reintegration programme. 95 respondents, representing 47% strongly agreed. 5 respondents, representing 2.5% disagreed that they were not informed about the reintegration programme. This result therefore indicated that ex-combatants from Boko Haram/ISWAP were fully informed about the Operation Safe Corridor Programme. This means the ex-Boko Haram/ISWAP combatant know what they were into.

On de-radicalization, 98 respondents, representing 49% agreed that they were de-radicalized. 95 respondents, representing 47.5% strongly agreed. 5 respondents, representing 2.5% disagreed. 2 respondents, representing 1% strongly disagreed. This result indicated that the ex-Boko Haram/ISWAP terrorists were de-radicalized at OPSC camps/centre.

On rehabilitation, 95 respondents, representing 47.5% agreed that they were rehabilitated. 98 respondents, representing 49% strongly agreed. 5 respondents, representing 2.5% disagreed; and 2 respondents, representing 1% strongly disagreed. This result indicated that ex-combatants were fully rehabilitated at OPSC.

On social reintegration, 89 respondents, representing 40% agreed that they were socially reintegrated. 100 respondents, representing 50% strongly agreed. 10 respondents, representing 5% disagreed; and, 10 respondents representing 5% strongly disagreed. Majority of the respondents agreed that they were socially reintegrated

On economical reintegration, 95 respondents, representing 47% agreed. 98 respondents, representing 49% strongly agreed that they were economically reintegrated. 2 respondents, representing 1% disagreed; while 5 respondents, representing 2.5% strongly disagreed that were not economically reintegrated.

The data obtained on approaches used by OPSC for reintegration of ex-Boko Haram/ISWAP combatants, indicated that they use information as a strategy to enlighten the ex- Boko Haram/ISWAP combatants on what it meant by integration and what is required before taking them back home after being in hostility. De-radicalization was also one of the strategies used by OPSC for reintegration of ex-Boko Haram/ISWAP combatant. The ex- Boko Haram/ISWAP combatants were taught about the negative part of radicalization and the need to forget about its principles. Rehabilitation was also an approach used and the national consciousness of the ex-combatants was reawakened by teaching them national core values and symbols. Social reintegration was also an approach where the ex-combatants were engaged in games/sporting activities like football, exercise, etc to make them socialized when returned into communities. Economic reintegration was also in the approach used by OPSC and the ex- Boko Haram/ISWAP combatants were trained in different skills so as to be self-reliant when reintegrated.

At the community level however, the data obtained from the questionnaire and focus group interview responses indicated that OPSC did not inform members of the host communities or sensitized them on the reintegration programmes of the ex-combatants. This affected community participation as major stakeholders in the process of reintegration. One can say in the affirmative that non community involvement in this approach is the gap created by OPSC for the reintegration of ex-Boko Haram/ISWAP combatant.

Literature reviewed indicates that DDR is accepted internationally as a viable approach to peace building by both state and non-state actors like as supported by United Nations, United Nations Peace keeping Programme (UNDP); International Organization for Migration (I.O.M); the World Bank and host of others. Muggah (2004) observed that insecurity lingers after violent wars and also serves as threat to partners' ability to unite, coexist and advance in sociopolitical and economic development. This gave room for evolution of numerous peace building tactics, which does not, denied the use of military force in post-conflict environments, but incorporate psycho-social therapy and socioeconomic components. It was in a quest to sustain peace in post conflict societies that Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) was proposed by a former Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros-Ghali (1992). The United Nations (UN, 2004), revealed that in this new approach, nations and international organizations focuses on a number of concerns, including the humanitarian agenda, infrastructure rehabilitation, and peacekeeping. This was why Carames (2006) concurred that DDR was used in over 20 countries in 2005 alone, as an approach to peace building and has recorded relative political, social and economic success. This was also corroborated by Banholzer (2014) and Hendricks & Kisiamgani (2007).

Table 2. Communities Understanding, Acceptability and Participation in Reintegration Programme

	Items	**Rating Scale**					
		SA	***A***	***U***	***D***	***SD***	***Total***
1.	You fully understand what is integration programme	30 10%	25 8.3%	0 0%	120 40%	125 41.7%	300 100%
2.	You truly accept the integration programme	30 10%	20 6.6%	0 0%	80 26.7%	170 56.7%	300 100%
3.	You participate in the process of ex-combatants back to the communities	30 10%	25 8.3%	0 0%	120 40%	125 41.7%	300 100%
4.	You were fully informed that ex-combatants would be brought back into the community.	15 5%	15 5%	0 0%	100 33.3%	170 56.7%	300 100%
5.	Your consent was sought before the reintegration of ex-combatant into the communities.	15 5%	15 5%	0 0%	110 36.7%	160 53.3%	300 100%
6.	Now that they are reintegrated, do you mingle with them	50 16.7%	30 10%	0 0%	100 33.3%	120 40%	300 100%
7.	The ex–combatant use to attend social gathering in the community	50 16.7%	40 13.3%	0 0%	100 33.3%	110 36.7%	300 100%

8.	You patronize the shops or businesses of the reintegrated ex-combatants	50 10%	20 6.7%	0 0%	120	40%	130	43.3%	300 100%
9.	The ex-combatants are being stigmatized by the communities members	70 23.3%	60 20%	0 0%	80 26.7%		90	30%	300 100%

Source: Field Survey 2022

The data about understanding of OPSC programme in North East indicated that 25 respondents, representing 8.3% agreed. 30 respondents, representing 10% strongly agreed that the programme is fully understood. 120 respondents, representing 40% disagreed. 125 respondents, representing 41.7% strongly disagreed. The responses indicated that communities do not understand what reintegration is all about. Further still, the focus group interview responses also confirmed that they were not formally oriented on the reintegration programmes by relevant authorities.

Data on acceptability indicated that, 20 respondents, representing 6.6% agreed. 30 respondents, representing 10% strongly agreed that they accepted. 80 respondents, representing 26.7% disagreed. 170 respondents, representing 56.7% strongly disagreed that the programme is not acceptable by the communities. The focus group interview also revealed that members of the host communities reluctantly accepted the reintegration programmes in their domain.

Data regarding participation showed that, 25 respondents, representing 8.3%, agreed. 30 respondents, representing 10% strongly agreed that the community participated. 120 respondents, representing 40% disagreed. 125 respondents, representing 41.7% strongly disagreed of the participation of the communities in the reintegration programme. The focus group interview indicated that the members of the host communities were not involved in the initiation, and execution of the reintegration programmme around their community.

It is therefore clear from the data obtained that the communities in which the reintegration programme is taking place in the North East Nigeria did not understand, accept nor participated in the process. For one to be able to accept a programme or policy; there is need to understand the rationale behind that policy. From the responses above, there was nothing tangible to see as understanding. Communities and people must be involved, and get proper understanding on any plan of action before its acceptance and thereafter full participation by them.

Table 3. Factors that Impedes or Assist to the Success of Reintegration Programmes of Ex-combatants into Communities

S/N	Items for Community Members	Rating Scale					
		SA	***A***	***U***	***D***	***SD***	***Total***
1	Economically	88 44%	105 52.5%	0 0%	5 2.5%	2 1%	200 100%
2	Socially	95 47.5%	100 50%	0 0%	5 2.5%	0 0%	200 100%
3	Politically	95 47.5%	100 50%	0 0%	5 2.5%	0 0%	200 100%
4	No stigmatization	45 22.5%	85 42.5%	0 0%	40 20%	30 15%	200 100%
5	No cases of recidivism	100 50%	100 50%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	200 100%
6	No fear	80 40%	95 47.5%	0 0%	10 5%	15 7.5%	200 100%
S/N	**Items for the Community**	***SA***	***A***	***U***	***D***	***SD***	***Total***
1	Sensitized about Reintegration	44 14.7%	40 13.3%	0 0%	120 40%	96 32%	300 100%
2	Fully participated in the Reintegration process	25 8.3%	25 8.3%	0 0%	10.7 35.7	143 47.7%	300 100%
3	Living in fear	100	95	0	85	20	300

		50%	31.7	0%	28.3%	6.7%	100%
4	Compensated	25 8.5%	20 6.7%	0 0%	125 41.7	130 43.3	300 100%
5	Government / NGOs' intervention	155 51.6%	95 31.7%	0 0%	30 10%	20 6.7%	300 100%
6	Reconciliation	20 6.7%	10 3.3%	0 0%	150 50%	120 40%	300 100%
7	Transitional Justice	10 3.3%	30 10%	0 0%	155 51.7%	105 35	300 100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Data on the factors that impeded or assisted for the success of reintegration of ex-Boko Haram/ISWAP combatant into the communities by OPSC indicated that 105 respondents, representing 52.5% agreed that economic factor is vital in reintegration. 88 respondents, representing 44% strongly agreed. 5 respondents, representing 2.5% disagreed; while 2 respondents, representing 1% strongly disagreed.

Social factor data indicated that 100 respondents, representing 50% agreed. 95 respondents, representing 47.5% strongly agreed that social factor is a contributing factor to the success of reintegration. 5 respondents, representing 2.5% disagreed. On political factor, 105 respondents, representing 52.5% disagreed. 95 respondents, representing 47.5% strongly agreed; while 5 respondents, representing 2.5% disagreed.

Data on non-stigmatization as a factor indicated that 85 respondents, representing 42.5% agreed that non stigmatization contributes to the success of reintegration. 45 respondents, representing 22.5% strongly agreed. 40 respondents, representing 20% agreed that non-stigmatization contributed to the success of reintegration programme. 30 respondents, representing 15% strongly agreed. On the cases of recidivism, 100 respondents, representing 50% agreed. 88 respondents, representing 44% strongly agreed that less cases of recidivism contributed to the success of reintegration programme. 10 respondents, representing 5% disagreed and 15 respondents, representing 7.5% strongly disagreed.

The above results indicated that, economic, social and political factors are vital to the success of reintegration programme as it concurs with the broader literature examined and the UN guidelines for DDR programmes. This result further revealed that once there is no stigmatization, the reintegration will be sustained because once one is reintegrated and is being stigmatized; there is likelihood of thinking for reengaging into hostility. From the results there are no cases of recidivism which indicated that there is sustainability of the programme.

Data from the community side indicated that they were not sensitized about the programme as such they did not fully participate in the process of reintegration of the ex-Boko Haram/ISWAP combatants. The data further revealed that members of the host communities were living in fear of the unknown due to the improper knowledge of what is happening or will be happening later. Members of the communities claimed that they were not compensated, no any reconciler move between the ex-combatants and the community. All these are issues that impede or could impede success of reintegration as deduced from the responses of the focus group interview conducted.

From the discourse above, it is clear that the approaches used were applicable to the ex-Boko Haram/ISWAP combatants only because they were the ones that were deradicalized, rehabilitated, mobilized and reintegrated. For members of the communities, the approach did not sensitized and mobilized them for maximum participation, or even possible compensation. Therefore, OPSC use appropriate approaches for the reintegration process, but members of the host communities were left out.

Many scholars, among who were Özerdem (2009), Özerdem & Sofizada (2006), Carames (2006), and Muggah (2004), support the notion that economic, social and political factors are basis for successful reintegration. They based their arguments on the fact that once ex-combatants are loaded with these factors, their chances of recidivism or rethinking of going back to hostilities is narrowed. On the other hand, some literature cautions that prioritizing ex-combatants and leaving the communities in which these ex-combatants are been reintegrated into can impede the success of the reintegration programme. Because the members of the communities may frustrate them by stigmatization and through any other way to make them uncomfortable, (Body, 2005; Kingma, 2000; Mazurana, 2004).

Table 4. Well-Being of the Ex-Combatants

S/N	Items	Rating Scale					
		SA	***A***	***U***	***D***	***SD***	***Total***
1	Your business is well patronized	100 50%	88 44%	0 0%	10 5%	2 1%	200 100%
2	You are feeding well	90 45%	101 50.5%	0 0%	4 2%	5 2.5%	200 100%
3	You are socializing freely	102 51%	90 45%	0 0%	4 2%	4 2%	200 100%
4	You are receiving assistance from NGOs'	100 50%	95 47.5%	0 0%	2 1%	3 1.5%	200 100%
5	You are involved in community	80 40%	100 50%	0 0%	5 2.5%	15 7.5%	200 100%
6	Your standard of living is better than before	105 52.5%	90 45%	0 0%	3 1.5%	2 1%	200 100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 4 revealed that 88 respondents, representing 44% agreed. 100 respondents, representing 50% strongly agreed that people patronize their business. 10 respondents, representing 5% disagreed; and 2 respondents, representing 1% strongly disagreed. Figures above showed that the ex-combatants businesses were not usually patronized.

On feeding well, 100 respondents, representing 50% agreed. 90 respondents, representing 45% strongly agreed that they are feeding well. 4 respondents, representing 2% disagreed; and 5 respondents, representing 2.5 strongly disagreed, that they were not feeding well. On socialization, 95 respondents, representing 47.5% agreed. 102 respondents, representing 51% strongly agreed that they freely socialized among them and with other people. 4 respondents, representing 2% strongly disagreed that they not freely socializing. On receiving assistance, 95 respondents, representing 47.5% agreed. 100 respondents, representing 50% strongly agreed that they are receiving assistance from NGOs. 2 respondents, representing 1% disagreed.

Involvement in community activities, 100 respondents, representing 50% agreed. 80 respondents, representing 40% strongly agreed that they are involved in community activities. 5 respondents, representing 2.5% disagreed, and 15 respondents, representing 7.5% strongly disagreed that they are not involve in community activities. Comparing their wellbeing with before, 90 respondents, representing 45% agreed. 105 respondents, representing 52.5% strongly agreed that their wellbeing is better than before when they were in hostilities. 3 respondents, representing 1.5% disagreed; and 2 respondents representing 1% strongly disagreed.

The data on the well-being of the ex- Boko Haram/ISWAP combatants indicated that their living standard is well in the camp. This is because they were well fed; they were socialized with some members of the community, engaged in some community services, praying together in mosque, playing football with youths and other social activities. The data further indicated that, the ex-combatant use to receive assistance from NGOs which contributed to their well-being. This makes their living standard better than when they were at hostilities. Banholzer (2014) stated that the wellbeing of reintegrated ex-combatants determine the level of reengagement. That most at times recidivism occurs when reintegrated ex-combatants standard of living is poor and frustrating. Therefore good standard of living is an impetus to the success of reintegration programme (Özerdem, 2002).

CONCLUSION

The de-radicalization of terrorists in the North East has led to increased acceptance of their surrender. However, host communities are concerned about their safety and the unpleasant experiences of ex-combatants. To ensure the success of the program, the government should adapt the program with community input, sensitize communities on the reintegration process, and incorporate Nigerian Correctional Service personnel. Professional counselors should be deployed to training camps, providing religious, social, economic, and psychological support. An independent body should be established to ensure balance in financing, training, and empowering ex-combatants. Ex-combatants should be provided with extensive support after reintegration to discourage re-engagement. Future research could explore community-based approaches, effective communication strategies, specialized personnel roles, and independent oversight bodies to enhance the effectiveness of reintegration programs. These research directions could provide comprehensive insights to improve reintegration processes in post-conflict settings.

REFERENCES

Banholzer, L. (2014). *When do disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes a success?* (Vol. 8).

Bartels, R. (2023). "The right to participate in hostilities": Combatant privilege vs criminal responsibility for members of organised armed groups during international and domestic criminal trials. In *Armed Groups and International Law* (pp. 64–90). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781800888340.00010

Body, T. (2005). *Reintegration of ex-combatants through micro-enterprise: An operational framework*. Canadian Peacekeeping Press.

Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). *An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping*.

Carames, R. (2006). *Community Reintegration*. Escolapau.

Galama, A., & Tongeren, V. P. (2002). *Towards better peace-building practice: On lessons learned, evaluation practice and aid & conflict*.

Hendricks, C., & Kisiamgani, E. (2007). Demobilisation and reintegration in the eastern DRC: On the wrong track? In *Southern Africa Human Security Programme*. ISSR.

Holmes, T. (2001). *A participatory approach in practice: Understanding field works use of participatory rural appraisal in action aid Gambia*. Institute of Development Studies.

Jöbstl, H. (2020). Bridging the accountability gap: Armed non-state actors and the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, *18*(3). https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqaa026

Kienou, S. M. (2021). The applicability of international humanitarian law to acts of violence perpetrated by unidentified armed individuals in the Sahel: The case of Burkina Faso. *International Review of the Red Cross*, *103*(918). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383122000303

Kingma, K. (2000). Assessing demobilization: Conceptual issues. In *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Developmental and Security Impacts*. MacMillan Press Ltd.

Lafreniere, A. N., & Callaghan, O. (2004). *Reintegrating ex-combatants*. DIVA Portal.

Mazurana, D. (2004). Women in armed opposition groups speak on war, protection and obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law. In *Geneva Call and the program for the Study of International Organizations*.

McQuinn, B., Terry, F., Kaplan, O., & Gutiérrez-Sanin, F. (2021). Introduction: promoting restraint in war. *International Interactions*, *47*(5). https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1931864

Muggah, R. (2004). The anatomy of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in the republic of Congo. *Conflict, Security & Development*, *4*(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/1467880042000206840

Özerdem, A. (2002). Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants in Afghanistan: Lessons learned from a cross-cultural perspective. *Third World Quarterly*, *23*(5). https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659022000028558

Özerdem, A. (2009). *Post-war recovery: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration*. IB Tauris and Co Ltd.

Özerdem, A., & Sofizada, A. H. (2006). Sustainable reintegration to returning refugees in post-Taliban Afghanistan: land-related challenges. *Conflict, Security & Development*, *6*(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800600590678

Worsnop, A. (2023). The Rebel and the Politician: Developing a Typology of Insurgent Civil–Military Relations. *Armed Forces and Society*. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X231193152